# PHP with backported patches and NIS2: does it count as supported software?
Table of Contents
If you run websites or business applications for a client subject to NIS2, sooner or later the question arrives: "are your PHP versions supported?". If the honest answer is "PHP 7.4, but with the Linux distribution's security patches", the questionnaire usually has no box for that.
The doubt comes from measure PR.PS-02 of the Italian cybersecurity agency ACN's basic specifications: only software with guaranteed availability of security updates may be installed, and updates must be applied without undue delay. PHP 7.4 and 8.0 have been end of life for the PHP project since November 2022 and November 2023, yet some Linux distributions (Red Hat and its derivatives for both, Ubuntu with a Pro subscription for 7.4) keep fixing their flaws through backporting: they take the fix written for the recent version and apply it to the old code, leaving the version number unchanged. Is anyone in that situation inside or outside the measure?
An honest premise, as in NIS2 and suppliers: this is not legal advice but a technical reading of the measure's text, ACN's FAQ and the policies of Red Hat, Debian and Ubuntu; it follows the Italian rules, because that is where most of our clients are, and where ACN has not spoken we say so.
What PR.PS-02 actually says (and what it doesn't)
The text in Annex 1 of ACN Determination 379907 of 19 December 2025 is in Italian; the translations below are ours and the quoted fragments are the original. Point 1: without prejudice to motivated and documented regulatory or technical reasons, and in accordance with the results of the risk assessment under measure ID.RA-05, only software, operating systems included, "per il quale è garantita la disponibilità di aggiornamenti di sicurezza" (for which the availability of security updates is guaranteed) is installed. Point 2, with the same opening clause on documented reasons: the latest security updates "rilasciati dal produttore" (released by the producer) are installed "senza ingiustificato ritardo" (without undue delay).
Two details matter. Point 1 is written in the passive voice: it does not say who has to guarantee the updates. The word "produttore" appears only in point 2 and ACN's NIS FAQ never defines it; none of those FAQ deals with backporting or with software end of life (checked on 6 November 2026). So saying that a PHP with the Linux distributor's patches meets the measure is this article's authors' interpretation, a reasonable one, but not an ACN position.
The second detail is that the measure provides for exceptions by itself. The clause on the results of the risk assessment ("in accordo agli esiti della valutazione del rischio") was added precisely with the December 2025 update (FAQ DSB.1), and measure ID.RA-08 asks to resolve vulnerabilities through security updates or mitigation measures, where available, or else by accepting and documenting the risk in the risk treatment plan. In plain terms: software outside the rule is not banned outright, but it must be justified, assessed and documented. In contracts, the client transposes the substance of the measure rather than its wording (FAQ MSB.16): the phrasing you will find in the questionnaire is the client's choice.
Backporting: what it really covers and what it doesn't
Red Hat states that "for most products, our default practice is to backport security fixes", and warns customers that "just looking at the version number of a package will not tell them if they are vulnerable or not": what counts is the security advisory with its CVE code, the public identifier of each flaw. Debian's Security FAQ gives the same guidance: check the package changelog, or compare the exact version number with the one in the advisory. How to verify that on the server is something we showed with PHP2Shell.
The limits deserve the same clarity.
- It only covers the flaws the distributor decides to fix, on its own scale. RHEL 8 is in its maintenance phase, where Red Hat's standard errata criteria cover Critical and Important CVEs and Moderate ones with a CVSS score (the 0 to 10 scale that measures how severe a flaw is) of 7 or higher, and "all errata are provided at Red Hat's discretion". Ubuntu Pro promises fixes for "critical, high and selected medium" vulnerabilities. Debian LTS (the Long Term Support run by a group of volunteers and companies) warns that "not all packages of the Debian archive are supported by LTS". The scale belongs to the distributor: PHP2Shell scores 9.2 out of 10 on the CVSS 4.0 scale used by the PHP project, "Important" at 8.1 on Red Hat's CVSS 3.1 scale, while the US NVD gives 9.8 on that same 3.1 scale.
- No new features, no fixes that are not security fixes. And the ecosystem does not read changelogs, the package's record of changes: WordPress, PrestaShop and Composer libraries look at the version number, as we explain in PHP end of life.
- A backport has an expiry date, the distribution's. Not php.net's, which for 8.2 is 31 December 2026, for 8.3 31 December 2027, for 8.4 31 December 2028 and for 8.5 31 December 2029.
The concrete case: the same PHP 7.4 on Rocky or AlmaLinux 8, three different sources
From the distribution's module. In RHEL 8 the php:7.4 stream (the versioned package set the distribution publishes and maintains) is a "Full Life" stream: it follows the operating system's life cycle, with the maintenance phase running until 31 May 2029; AlmaLinux 8 and Rocky Linux 8 end security support on the same day. The proof: on 21 October 2026 Red Hat published advisory RHSA-2026:87080
for php:7.4 with both PHP2Shell flaws, and on 22 October ALSA-2026:87080
and RLSA-2026:87080
followed for AlmaLinux and Rocky. The instructive comparison is on RHEL 9: PHP 8.0, a "Full Life" stream, received the fix (RHSA-2026:87151
); PHP 8.1, a stream retired in May 2025, does not appear in the list of advisories on Red Hat's CVE page (checked on 6 November 2026). The stream decides, not the PHP number.
From the Remi repository. The same PHP 7.4, but from a third-party repository maintained by one person. In his end-of-life announcement for 7.4, Remi writes that "this is a best effort action, depending on my spare time, without any warranty, only to give users more time to migrate". For PHP2Shell the repository's 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1 packages carry the date of 21 October in their changelog, the same day as the release, under the entry "Mitigation fix": it is the minimal source backport the PHP project provided for the closed branches. Valuable work, but with no contract nor end-of-support date to write into a document. The same goes for Ondřej Surý's repository for Debian and Ubuntu, which he says he maintains "mostly in my free time".
Debian and Ubuntu. On Ubuntu 20.04 PHP 7.4 was fixed with package 7.4.3-4ubuntu2.29+esm5, but only through Ubuntu Pro (free for personal use on up to 5 physical machines), covered until May 2030. Debian 12 ships PHP 8.2, which php.net closes on 31 December 2026; Debian 12 is in LTS until 30 June 2028 and October's fix came from the LTS team with advisory DLA-4848-1 of 21 October. Debian 11 with PHP 7.4, on the other hand, left LTS on 31 August 2026: what remains is Freexian's Extended LTS (ELTS), a commercial service that the Debian wiki says "is not an official Debian project", whose package scope "is defined by the organizations which subscribe"; for php7.4 it published advisory ELA-1853-1 on 21 October, citing both PHP2Shell CVEs.
What you can defend in front of a client, and what you can't
Defensible: patches from the distributor, with a public life cycle, advisories carrying CVE codes and a definite end date. In a questionnaire you write: "PHP 7.4 from the php:7.4 module of AlmaLinux 8, supported by the distributor until 31 May 2029, latest advisory ALSA-2026:87080
of 22 October 2026, migration to PHP 8.3 planned by ...". It remains an interpretation: a client whose contract says "version supported by the software producer" may not accept it.
Defensible only as a temporary exception: third-party repositories. This is the measure's "documented technical reason", with a risk assessment, a migration date and compensating measures. It is not a stable state to settle into.
Not defensible: PHP 7.3 or earlier, Debian 11 without ELTS, a hosting provider that "says" it patched without an advisory to show, or "php -v shows 7.4.33, so it's up to date". If the server handles personal data, the GDPR on the infrastructure side adds to the NIS2 picture, and an abandoned component is hard to sustain as "state of the art".
What to document: the sheet to show the client
- Inventory: server, exact package version (for example
php-common-7.4.33-8.module_el8.10.0+4321+cf5fd4bb.x86_64, whatrpm -q php-commonreturns on AlmaLinux 8 on 6 November 2026), execution mode (PHP-FPM or mod_php) and applications served. - Patch source: distribution stream or third-party repository, with a link to the life cycle policy.
- Two end-of-support dates: the distributor's and php.net's, written side by side.
- Proof of the latest patch: advisory id and date, plus the changelog line that cites the CVE. On Debian and Ubuntu the package name follows the distribution's PHP version (
php8.2-commonon Debian 12,php8.4-commonon Debian 13,php8.3-commonon Ubuntu 24.04,php7.4-commonon Ubuntu 20.04):
zcat /usr/share/doc/php8.2-common/changelog.Debian.gz | grep -m1 'CVE-2026-10961[89]'On AlmaLinux, Rocky and RHEL:
rpm -q --changelog php-common | grep -m1 'CVE-2026-10961[89]'We re-ran both commands on 6 November 2026 in clean containers: on Debian 12 (8.2.35-1~deb12u1), Debian 13 (8.4.27-1~deb13u1), Ubuntu 24.04 (8.3.6-0ubuntu0.24.04.13) and AlmaLinux 8 with the php:7.4 module the line with the two CVEs comes out. On Ubuntu 20.04 without Ubuntu Pro the package stops at 7.4.3-4ubuntu2.29 and the command prints nothing: an empty result is the proof that the fix is not there.
- Migration plan: target version, date, owner, staging environment and rollback plan.
- Compensating measures: a reverse proxy or WAF (the filter that inspects requests before they reach the site) with request limits, network segmentation, multi-factor authentication on administrative access, centralised logs.
- Formal exception: the technical reason (for example a custom application not compatible with PHP 8), the risk assessment and the acceptance in the treatment plan, signed by whoever decides.
If the missing step is the migration, moving a site to a supported PHP version is a fix from €149, with the price set in the quote and a test on a copy before production is touched; for e-commerce stores and custom code we quote after the inventory.
In summary
PR.PS-02 asks for software with guaranteed security updates, does not say from whom, and provides for justified, documented exceptions. A PHP that is end of life for php.net but covered by the distribution's module, with public advisories and a definite end date, is a defensible position, provided you understand that a backport only covers the flaws the distributor chooses to fix and expires with the distribution. The same PHP from a third-party repository is a bridge, to be documented as an exception with an arrival date. Everything else does not hold up in front of a questionnaire, nor in front of a scanner.
Sources
- ACN, Annex 1: basic security measures for important entities (PR.PS-02, ID.RA-05, ID.RA-08, in Italian)
- ACN, NIS FAQ: security measures and incident notification (DSB.1, MSB.16, in Italian)
- ACN, Basic obligations and specifications (Determination 379907/2025)
- PHP, Supported Versions
- PHP, Unsupported Branches
- PHP, security advisory of 21 October 2026 (minimal source backports for 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1)
- GitHub, advisory GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w for CVE-2026-109618 (CVSS 4.0)
- NVD, CVE-2026-109618
- Red Hat, Backporting security fixes
- Red Hat, Enterprise Linux Life Cycle (errata criteria in the maintenance phase)
- Red Hat, Application Streams Life Cycle (PHP streams)
- Red Hat, CVE-2026-109618
- AlmaLinux, ALSA-2026:87080 php:7 .4 security update
- AlmaLinux, Release Notes (AlmaLinux 8 security support until 31 May 2029)
- Rocky Linux, RLSA-2026:87080
- Rocky Linux, Download (planned EOL of Rocky Linux 8)
- Remi, "PHP 7.4 is retired"
- Remi, modular repository for Enterprise Linux 8 (changelog of packages php-common 7.4.33-31, 8.0.30-21 and 8.1.34-6)
- Debian, Security FAQ
- Debian, LTS: schedule
- Debian, LTS: unsupported packages
- Debian, DLA-4848-1 php8.2 security update
- Debian, Extended LTS (Freexian)
- Freexian, ELA-1853-1 php7.4 security update
- Ubuntu, Expanded Security Maintenance
- Ubuntu Pro (free for personal use)
- Ubuntu, CVE-2026-109618
- deb.sury.org, PHP packages for Debian and Ubuntu
